Risks associated with pathogens in composted biosolids - a discussion paper prepared for the Water Authority of Western Australia by Gibbs, R.A. & Ho, G.E.
-"-
Environmental  Science  Report  No.  95/6 
RISKS  ASSOCIATED WITH 
PATHOGENS IN COMPOSTED 
BIOSOLIDS 
A  Discussion Paper Prepared  for  the Water 
Authority  of Western  Australia 
by 
Robyn A.  Gibbs and Goen E.  Ho 
Institute  for  Environmental  Science 
Murdoch  University 
October  1995 
ISBN  No.  0-86905-450-3 SUMMARY 
Information available from published epidemiological studies, laboratory studies 
and field studies was surveyed and it was concluded that there was not sufficient 
evidence to suggest that the composting process completely removed the risk 
associated with the unrestricted marketing of biosolids to home gardens.  A risk 
assessment was therefore carried out to develop criteria for acceptable 
concentrations of pathogens in composted biosolids products.  A number of 
principles were developed for the risk assessment.  One of the principles was that 
the most at risk individuals should be protected and it was decided that these 
would be young children playing in home gardens.  Another principle was that 
microbial risk assessments should be based on risks of disease, rather than risks of 
death or risks of infection.  The principle adopted for deciding acceptable risk was 
that the risk of disease transmission through the re-use of composted biosolids 
products should be less than background transmission rates for that disease from 
other sources. 
The above risk assessment approach was used to develop suggested limits for 
Salmonella in composted biosolids products.  The suggested limit is less than 1 
Salmonella  in 50 g of biosolids product.  A recommendation is that guidelines 
should also require a maturation period for composted biosolids.  Further 
research on the regrowth potential of Salmonella  in composted biosolids 
products is recommended. 
Although there is a high potential risk associated with Giardia and enteric 
viruses in composted biosolids, it is recommended that guidelines should not 
require the monitoring of composted biosolids products for Giardia or enteric 
viruses until methods are further developed. 
It is also recommended that an epidemiological study of the effect of the 
unrestricted marketing of composted biosolids on the spread on enteric disease 
should be carried out. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
'Biosolids' is a term which was introduced by the US Water Pollution Control 
Federation to replace the generic term sludge (Smith, 1995).  The NSW EPA has 
used this term in a more restricted sense to refer only to sludge derived from 
wastewater treatment (EPA NSW, 1994).  As there is a difference in the scope of 
the sludge material covered by these two definitions, it was decided that in this 
paper the term biosolids will refer to material previously known as sewage 
sludge or wastewater sludge. 
This paper is a discussion of the risks associated with pathogens in biosolids 
disposal and re-use, but is limited in its scope.  The first limitation is that this 
paper concentrates on human pathogens and does not deal with risks from 
pathogens of animals and plants.  Secondly, this paper is primarily concerned 
with one disposal route for biosolids, which is the unrestricted marketing of 
biosolids.  This paper also focuses on the composting process as a means of 
producing biosolids suitable for unrestricted marketing. 
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2.  POTENTIAL RISKS FROM PATHOGENS IN BIOSOLIDS 
There is still a great deal of uncertainty about risks associated with pathogens in 
biosolids products.  Biosolids material has the potential to contain human and 
animal pathogens as it contains human faecal material.  It has been demonstrated 
that pathogens can be present in a variety of biosolids products (Gibbs et al., 1995). 
However, what level of risk this presents is still uncertain. 
There is also a climate in Australia where the water industry has to face the new 
and complex issues of 'liability, precautionary principles, due diligence and what 
constitutes reasonable care' (Chapman, 1995).  Liability of individual directors 
may increase due to loss of immunity when water authorities are corporatised or 
privatised.  This means insurance cover must be increased or risks reduced. 
An outbreak of waterborne cryptosporidiosis in Milwaukee in 1993 illustrates the 
problems which can result from an outbreak of disease for which the water 
provider is held responsible.  This outbreak resulted in over 400 000 cases of 
cryptosporidiosis (MacKenzie et al., 1994) with 50 to 100 deaths and has 
accumulated approximately $25 000 000 in lawsuits (Chapman, 1995). 
Along with illustrating the responsibility that the water industry has for the 
products which they supply, the Milwaukee outbreak highlights the importance 
of adequate monitoring for appropriate pathogens or indicators.  Traditionally 
the microbiological quality of drinking water has been assessed using the 
coliform and faecal coliform tests, and standards based on these are in place 
throughout the world.  In Milwaukee these proved to be inadequate.  In the case 
of biosolids products, monitoring is not routinely carried out.  There is not a 
traditional framework for assessing the risks associated with pathogens in 
biosolids and one needs to be developed. 
6 3.  MANAGEMENT OF RISKS FROM PATHOGENS IN 
BIOSOLIDS 
As outlined in Section 2 there is still a great deal of uncertainty about the risks to 
human health posed by the disposal and re-use of biosolids.  At present there is 
not agreement about how the potential risks of pathogens in biosolids should be 
managed. 
In most existing guidelines for biosolids management, management procedures 
are based on classification of biosolids in terms of the treatment the biosolids 
products have undergone, and then what disposal route is permissible. 
The proposal of this paper is that when it comes to risks of pathogens in 
biosolids, it may be useful to take a slightly different position and devise biosolids 
guidelines on the basis of what the level of exposure to the biosolids is going to 
be.  Different disposal routes could be classified on the basis of the exposure level 
they present, and then for each exposure level and disposal route a combination 
of treatments and/or monitoring requirements specified which would make that 
particular disposal route acceptable.  This would probably result in similar 
management practices to those presently in existence, but provide a stronger 
theoretical framework.  Although this paper only deals with human pathogens, 
risks from animal and plant pathogens could be included in this framework. 
On the basis of categorising the human exposure levels to biosolids products the 
following three categories are therefore proposed. 
The first category is very limited exposure.  Included in this category could be 
disposal practices such as landfilling or limited access minesite rehabilitation. 
The second category is limited exposure.  This includes the use of biosolids in 
various disposal practices where public access is possible, to varying degrees, but 
limited.  This category could, and probably should, be divided into further sub 
categories.  Included in this category could be disposal routes such as tree farming, 
market gardening, landscaping of public spaces etc. 
The third category is unrestricted exposure.  This category is for the unrestricted 
marketing of biosolids where the possibility of public exposure is high. 
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It is suggested that a management framework and standards should be developed 
for each exposure category on the basis of an informed analysis of the risks.  This 
should be based on a combination of epidemiological information and risk 
analysis. 
This paper will attempt to provide such an analysis for the third category, that of 
unrestricted exposure.  The disposal practice which results in unrestricted 
exposure is the unrestricted marketing of biosolids products. 
3.1  MANAGEMENT OF RISKS ASSOCIATED WITH UNRESTRICTED 
MARKETING OF BIOSOLIDS 
The philosophy endorsed in most biosolids guidelines is that for biosolids to be 
available in a unrestricted manner to the public they should have undergone 
significant treatment for stabilisation and reduction in pathogen concentrations. 
The most detailed information and guidelines for the unrestricted marketing of 
biosolids have been produced by the United States Environmental Protection 
Agency (US EPA).  In a support document for earlier federal sludge regulations, 
processes to further reduce pathogens (PFRPs) and process requirements for the 
PFRPs were outlined (US EPA, 1989a).  Biosolids which were available for 
unrestricted marketing had to have undergone a PFRP.  In more recent sludge 
guidelines, monitoring requirements have been introduced for biosolids which 
are available for unrestricted marketing, and these are described in another 
support document (US EPA, 1992).  The more recent document has introduced 
requirements to reduce pathogen densities below certain concentrations.  These 
concentrations were selected on the basis of the limits of detection methodologies 
(US EPA, 1992). 
The  major critique of this approach, and one of the reasons for preparing this 
paper, is that if monitoring requirements are introduced in biosolids guidelines, 
then the limits should take into account an analysis of risks posed by the 
pathogens present in biosolids.  For this reason, this paper introduces a risk 
assessment approach for devising limits.  The methodological limitations also 
need to be taken into account when setting standards.  However, if requirements 
are only based on method limitations then requirements may be too severe if 
methods are very advanced, or not adequate if methods are not well developed. 
This risk assessment approach is introduced in Section 4.2 below. 
8 .
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A number of processes may provide pathogen reduction to a level which makes 
biosolids possibly suitable for unrestricted marketing, as outlined by the US EPA 
(1992).  Two such processes outlined by the US EPA (1992) are thermal treatment 
and high pH-high temperature processes.  The full range of processes is not 
discussed further in this paper but it is proposed that monitoring requirements 
developed for composted biosolids could be transferable to other processes, as 
they are based on the principle of acceptable risk.  The focus of this paper is on the 
composting process and the rest of this paper is devoted to addressing the risks 
associated with pathogens in composted biosolids. 
9 4.  COMPOSTED BIOSOLIDS 
There are two basic approaches which can be used for assessing the risks 
associated with biosolids products.  The first is an epidemiological approach and 
the second a risk assessment approach.  These are discussed below. 
4.1  EPIDEMIOLOGY 
Epidemiological information in all areas of biosolids disposal is scarce.  The main 
reason for this is that costs involved in epidemiological studies are extremely 
high.  Costs involved in prospective studies described by Jakubowski (1986), 
which were conducted in the late 1970s and early 1980s, ranged from US$178 000 
to US$2 000 000. 
The epidemiological studies which have been conducted, or reported cases where 
disease appears to have been spread by biosolids, are primarily associated with the 
use of biosolids on agricultural land.  On the basis of the US epidemiological 
studies described by Jakubowski (1986), risks appear to be low.  However there do 
appear to be cases where disease has been associated with biosolids disposal. 
Block (1986) described a case where four men spreading biosolids on farmland 
became infected with hepatitis A.  An outbreak of 98 human cases of 
salmonellosis appeared to have been caused by drinking unpasteurised milk 
from a farm in Scotland (Pike, 1986).  Biosolids containing effluent from a 
chicken factory had been sprayed on grassland and cattle re-introduced shortly 
afterwards.  Another milk born epidemic in Czechoslovakia (Raska et. al., 1966) 
appeared to have been caused by biosolids spread on land. 
These small number of studies have shown that biosolids used on agricultural 
land can cause disease.  However, if guidelines are followed which include 
biosolids treatment or restrictions on the use of biosolids amended areas and 
public access, then the health risks appear to be low. 
This view has been strongly expressed by two British writers.  Alderslade (1981) 
felt that surveillance of the incidence of disease, and investigation of outbreaks 
were effective in protecting public health.  Similarly (Pike, 1981) felt that 
operational guidelines were sufficient to protect the public from the spread of 
disease from biosolids reuse.  This view is supported by EC (1986) and UK (DOE, 
1989) sludge guidelines. 
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There appears to have been no studies of the health effects of the unrestricted 
marketing of biosolids for home use.  One study was conducted which examined 
the health of biosolids compost workers (Clark et. al.,  1984).  Workers involved in 
composting showed evidence of an immune response to antigens which was 
higher then groups not involved with compost activities.  More symptoms of 
burning eyes and skin irritation were also reported among compost workers. 
However, these may have been associated with high dust levels rather than 
biosolids. 
There appears to have been no epidemiological studies which have investigated 
the health effects of unrestricted public exposure to composted biosolids.  This 
would be a valuable area of investigation. 
4.2  POTENTIAL RISK 
As there is no epidemiological information which can be used to evaluate the 
risks associated with the unrestricted marketing of composted biosolids, it is 
useful to examine the literature concerning the effect of composting on pathogen 
concentrations in biosolids. 
A number of laboratory studies and a small number of larger scale studies have 
investigated the effect of composting on pathogen concentrations in biosolids. 
Most of these studies have focused on salmonellae.  No published information 
appears to be available on the effect of composting on Giardia cyst concentrations, 
although this appeared to be the pathogen which presented the most potential 
risk in dewatered biosolids (Gibbs et. al., 1995). 
Until recently it was assumed that biosolids which had met US EPA composting 
criteria (US EPA, 1989a) would be free of pathogens.  Pederson (1981) concluded 
that composting was a satisfactory means of achieving biosolids disinfection, 
provided that specified temperatures were maintained throughout the compost 
pile.  However, evidence provided by Yanko (1988) and Skavanis. and Yanko · 
(1994) suggests that this may not be the case.  In a study by Yanko (1988) biosolids 
based compost products from 26 different composting facilities were sampled 
over the course of one year.  Salmonella  spp., toxigenic E.coli  and Yersinia 
enterocolica  were detected.  Of these, salmonellae were the most commonly 
detected (occurring in approximately 20% of samples).  Similarly, more recently it 
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was reported that salmonellae were detected in 25% of composted biosolids 
products (Skavanis and Yanko, 1994).  The composting facilities were meant to be 
operating according to US PFRP guidelines. 
These studies suggest that achievement of operational criteria may not guarantee 
the safety of com  posted biosolids products.  One of the major problems may be 
that time and temperature requirements are difficult to achieve uniformly 
through entire batches of composted biosolids.  Another possibility may be that 
composting does not ensure the complete removal of salmonellae, which are 
present but undetected using current methodology. 
In a recent study of composted biosolids in Western Australia, although 
composting process requirements were achieved in some sections of a forced 
aeration static pile composting system, in situ temperature monitoring showed 
that this was not achieved for complete batches of biosolids (Mort, personal 
communication).  In this study it was found that nearly all samples of final 
composted biosolids were positive for Salmonella  (Mort, personal 
communication).  In small scale batch studies using the same mixture it was 
found that Salmonella  grew in composting mixtures.  In this small scale system 
Giardia  cyst concentrations decreased but Giardia was not completely removed by 
the composting process.  Cyst concentrations were not reduced below 1000 cysts 
per gram of composted biosolids (Mort, personal communication). 
The studies described above suggest that process requirements may not ensure 
the complete removal of pathogens during composting processes, but this should 
be investigated further.  It appears that monitoring may also be necessary to 
ensure the safety of biosolids products.  For this reason the risk assessment 
approach is introduced below and then applied to developing monitoring criteria 
for pathogens in composted biosolids. 
4.3  RISK ASSESSMENT APPROACH 
Risk assessment has been defined in a number of ways but the definition which 
has been applied in risk assessments associated with biosolids is that provided by 
the US  National Research Council (NRC, 1983).  Their definition is that risk 
assessment is: 
"the characterization of the potential adverse health effects of human 
exposures to environmental hazards". 
12 .l 
This risk approach was defined by the US National Research Council (NRC, 1983) 
as consisting of four components.  These were: 
i.  Hazard identification: 
The process of determining whether exposure to an agent can 
cause an increase in the incidence of a health condition.  As 
discussed in a US EPA document describing the risk assessment 
methodology for sludge (US EPA, 1989b), this should also include 
reference to the nature and severity of the effect as well as the 
incidence. 
ii.  Dose-response assessment: 
The process of characterising the relations between the dose of an 
agent and the incidence of the adverse health effect. 
iii.  Exposure assessment: 
The process of measuring or estimating the intensity, frequency 
and duration of exposures to an agent currently present, or 
estimating hypothetical exposures that may arise. 
i v.  Risk characterization: 
Performed by combining the exposure and dose-response 
assessments to estimate the likelihood of an effect. 
This approach was used by the US EPA as the model for developing guidelines 
for sludge disposal (US EPA, 1989b). 
Although the risk assessment approach has been defined for chemicals in 
biosolids (US EPA, 1989b), it has not been well developed for microbials.  For this 
reason, before a risk assessment could be carried out, some principles needed to 
be developed.  These are introduced below. 
4.3.1  Microbial Risk Versus Chemical Risk 
Many of the basic assumptions used for chemical risk assessments may not be 
directly transferable to assessing microbial risk. 
As outlined in the reference document to the development of US EPA sludge 
guidelines (US EPA, 1989b), determining acceptable concentrations for non 
carcinogenic chemicals involves determining the critical systemic effect, which is 
the adverse effect occurring at the lowest dose.  The reference dose (RfD) is the 
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daily exposure that is likely to be without appreciable risk of deleterious effects 
during a lifetime. 
Similarly in draft Australian Drinking Water Guidelines (NHMRC and 
ARMCANZ, 1994) the guideline values for pesticides and organic and inorganic 
chemicals are the concentrations that, based on present knowledge, do not result 
in any significant risk to the health of the consumer over a lifetime of 
consumption (the no observable effect level, NOEL). 
There are a number of ways in which this approach is probably not appropriate 
for microbials and these are described below. 
4.3.1.1  Lifetime Exposure Models 
The cumulative lifetime exposure model used for chemicals is probably not 
appropriate for microbials.  Single hit exposure to microbials can result in an 
adverse health effect and effects are generally not cumulative.  Previous exposure 
may cause immune suppression which could increase the likelihood of infection, 
or conversely previous exposure may result in the development of immunity 
which will reduce the effect of repeated exposures.  However, it was not 
considered possible to incorporate these effects into a risk assessment model, so a 
single hit exposure model is recommended. 
4.3.1.2  Population Versus Individual Risk 
Chemical exposure models do not take into account variation in human host, 
response which is an important factor with microbial exposure.  With microbials 
the large variation in susceptibility will significantly affect risk.  For this reason, 
expressing risk in terms of general population risks is probably not appropriate 
for microbials.  Risks need to be expressed for individuals within sub-groups of 
the population. 
As outlined in a discussion paper on risk assessment produced by the Western 
Australian EPA (1990), the principle that no individual should have to bear an 
unusually high risk can be expressed by individual risk criteria.  Secondly the 
principle that no community should have to bear an unfairly high risk can be 
expressed by 'community', 'societal' or 'population' risk criteria.  Although it 
may also be useful to investigate population risks, this paper focuses on 
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individual risks.  This is because, in the case of microbials in biosolids, individual 
risk criteria will need to be more stringent than population risk criteria. 
Therefore the first suggested principle is that: 
Principle 1. 
Risk assessments for microbials in biosolids should be based on risks to 
the most at risk individuals. 
Principle 1 should be applied in two areas of the risk assessment.  Firstly exposure 
levels should be based on most exposed individuals.  Secondly dose-response 
data should be based on most susceptible individuals. 
This principle of protecting susceptible or vulnerable individuals has been 
applied in the area of industrial exposure.  For assessing the safety of location of a 
proposed development of a potentially hazardous nature, the criteria shown in 
Table 1 were suggested (Western Australian EPA, 1990).  Table 1 was developed 
on the basis of variations in people's vulnerability to the risk and their ability to 
take evasive action.  Although Table 1 is not directly applicable to risk criteria for 
disease rather than death, it introduces the principle of protecting the most at risk 
individuals. 
Table 1.  Suggested Individual Fatality Risk Criteria for Acceptable Risk From 
Industry on Various Land Uses (Western Australian EPA, 1990) 
Land Use  Suggested Criterion 
(risk in a million/year) 
Hospitals, schools, child-care facilities, old age housing  0.5 
Residential, hotels, motels, tourist resorts  1 
Commercial developments including retail centres,  5 
offices and entertainment centres 
Sporting complexes and active open spaces  10 
Other industrial  50 
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The approach of calculating risk for most at risk individuals has been questioned 
by various sources because it can lead to an unrealistic amplification of risk.  The 
US EPA (1989b) outlined a drawback of this approach and this was that the 
compounding of worst-case assumptions may lead to improbable results.  They 
suggested that the key to the effective use of this methodology is careful and 
systematic examination of the effects of varying each of the input parameters, 
using estimates of central tendency and upper-limit values to gain an 
appreciation for the variability of the result. 
Similarly Stevens et al.  (1995) suggested that Monte Carlo simulation should be 
used to allow consideration of the variability of input parameters used in the risk 
assessment.  With this approach, rather than assigning worst case or typical 
values, a probability distribution is assigned to each parameter. 
In the case of microbials the representation of uncertainty in estimates would be 
valuable.  However, it is still maintained that this should be carried out for 
individuals within different sub populations, rather than representing the whole 
population by one analysis.  For the most at risk individuals within the sub 
population uncertainty of estimates could be expressed, and Monte Carlo type 
analysis for representing uncertainty may be appropriate. 
4.3.1.3  Mortality and Morbidity 
Most chemical risk assessments of health effects are based on the risk of death 
(mortality).  However, it is suggested that risk assessments based on adverse 
health effects (morbidity) are more appropriate to microbial risk assessment.  The 
risks of death from microbial exposure may be low for most infectious agents, but 
the adverse affects caused by disease still unacceptable to the community. 
An added dimension with microbials is that exposure to a microbial agent may 
result in infection but not demonstrable illness.  This may then impact on the 
general health of the community by providing a reservoir of disease for further 
infection.  As this is very difficult to assess it is suggested that risks should be 
based on disease rather than infection. 
Therefore the second principle which is suggested is that: 
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Principle 2. 
Microbial risk assessments should be based on risks of demonstrable 
disease, rather than risks of death, or infection. 
As there is not such an established history of assessing risk of disease rather than 
death, there are not well established practices, particularly with regard to risk 
management decisions.  This will be discussed further in Section 4.4.2 below. 
4.4  APPLICATION OF RISK ASSESSMENT APPROACH TO SETTING 
CRITERIA 
When the four steps of risk assessment outlined in Section 4.3 above are carried 
out, a hazard is defined, and the risks then quantified through dose-response and 
exposure assessment.  To use the risk assessment approach for developing 
monitoring criteria the same process needs to be carried out but acceptable risks 
also need to be defined.  Following hazard identification, the next step in using 
risk assessment to develop criteria is to define an allowable or acceptable 
exposure.  The dose-response and exposure level then need to be combined with 
the acceptable risk to set standards.  The steps involved in developing criteria for 
microbials in biosolids therefore are: 
1.  Hazard Identification 
2.  Development of Criteria for Acceptable Risk 
3.  Dose-Response Assessment 
4.  Exposure Assessment 
5.  Calculation of Limits. 
4.4.1  Hazard Identification 
A qualitative risk assessment was carried out previously in which the relative 
health risks represented by different groups of pathogens were grouped on the 
basis of the number of reported cases (in Western Australia), the excreted load, 
the persistence, and infectious dose (Gibbs and Ho, 1993).  On the basis of this 
assessment the high risk group of pathogens consisted of enteric viruses, and the 
second highest risk group of Salmonella, Giardia and Trichuris.  As the people 
infected with Trichuris  were mainly recent immigrants and travellers, it 
appeared that the number of excreting individuals in the resident population 
17 were low.  Further studies were therefore conducted on the pathogens considered 
to present the most risk, the enteric viruses, Salmonella and Giardia.  These 
pathogens were detected in anaerobically digested and dewatered biosolids with 
average concentrations of 5.3, 0.4 and 920/g wet weight respectively.  On the basis 
of infectious dose information provided by Shuval et.  al.  (1986) risks of infection 
from ingesting 0.1  g of biosolids were calculated to be less than 1% for viruses and 
Salmonella, and greater than 1% for Giardia. 
In the absence of any information about the effect of composting on viruses and 
Giardia, and on the basis that Salmonella appears to have survived and regrown 
in some composting processes, stored biosolids and biosolids applied to land 
(Gibbs et. al., 1995), it is likely that these pathogens will also present the most risk 
in composted biosolids.  It is therefore suggested that these should be included in 
considerations of setting criteria for monitoring composted biosolids. 
4.4.2  Acceptable Risk 
The meaning of acceptable risk can be expressed in various ways.  Commonly it is 
expressed as the question:  'how safe is safe enough'?  How safe is safe enough 
has not been defined previously for the area of microbial risk and is still a 
contentious issue for most areas of risk. 
Acceptable risks have generally been defined in terms of risk of death and this 
approach is described below.  However, the principle recommended above is that 
with microbial risk, acceptable risk as it relates to disease should be used as an 
alternative approach, so this is also discussed below. 
The approach taken by a Royal Society Study Group (1983) to defining the concept 
of acceptable risk was to divide the risks to the individual into three broad zones. 
In category one were risks higher than a  certain level which were unacceptable 
whatever the benefits.  In category two were risks that were between upper and 
lower limits and for which it was necessary to consider the interrelationship of 
level of risk, detriment, costs and benefits.  In the third category were risks of a 
frequency so low that the manager or regulator of risk could reasonably regard 
them as negligible in their overall impact on society, even though the 
consequences to the rare individual might be serious. 
The report also discusses some possible quantitative guidelines.  These were: 
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1.  The Upper Limit of Risk to an Individual. 
A continuing risk of death of 1 in 100 would be described as 
unacceptable in essentially all circumstances. 
2.  Risks Between Upper and Lower Limits. 
A risk of 1 in 1000 was not considered to be totally unacceptable in 
all circumstances, as long as the individual understood the risk, and 
the benefits, and that everything reasonable had been done to reduce 
it.  However, risks in the borderline of unacceptability would require 
the most stringent process of justification before they could be 
accepted, particularly if they did not arise from the voluntary choice 
of the individuals affected. 
3.  The Negligible Level of Risk to an Individual. 
The point at which an imposed risk could be legitimately treated as 
trivial by a decision maker could be judged as the point at which 
individuals who were aware of the risks they run would not 
commit significant resources of their own to reduce them. 
Individuals would have widespread views but there is a commonly 
held view that few would take action at the annual level of 10-6. 
On the basis of these figures, risk management would be used to compare risks, 
detriments, costs and benefits, if the annual risks of death to the individuals were 
between 1o-3 and 10-6. 
As this approach refers to risk of death, it is not directly transferable to defining 
acceptable risks of disease.  However, it does introduce the principle of 'de 
minimis' risk, or negligible risk.  The 'de minimis' risk approach comes from the 
legal principle that the law does not concern itself with trifles.  With risk this 
means that there is a threshold of concern below which we would be indifferent 
to changes in the level of risk (Fiksel, 1987).  It is an acceptance that zero risk is 
neither achievable or desirable. 
There have been a variety of suggested means of setting acceptable risks on the 
basis of 'de minimis' risk.  These include setting levels at natural background 
levels, such as for radiation, and alternatively basing acceptable risks on the risk 
levels of various hazards that are commonly encountered in daily life (Menkes 
and Fray, 1987).  The assumption is that these levels of risk are acceptable to the 
population. 
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An acceptable limit for risk of infection from microbials was recently set for the 
first time when a 'de minimis' type approach was used for drinking water 
standards.  Quite a landmark decision was that by the US EPA in the Drinking 
Water Act (US EPA, 1989c) when it was stated that drinking water should create 
no more than 1 extra gastro intestinal case per 10 000 people per year .  Discussion 
which went into forming this decision was reported by Regli et.  al.  (1988).  The 
basis of this limit was that the risk limit of 1 in 10 000 people per year was similar 
to that currently being experienced in the US and Canada through drinking water 
exposure, and was not out of proportion with other common microbial risks. 
Earlier discussion of acceptable risks from microbials has pointed towards this 
kind of approach.  In discussion of the risks of sludge disposal to land Akin et.  al. 
(1977) concluded that it would be unrealistic to require all domestic wastes that 
are applied to land to be pathogen free.  They highlighted the point that this 
could not be guaranteed without the complete testing of all waste with methods 
that were 100 percent efficient for all pathogens, which would be economically 
impractical and technically unattainable.  The goal should therefore be to achieve 
and maintain the microbial hazard from waste disposal on land at an acceptable 
risk level.  They concluded that for the health scientist, acceptable could be 
defined as when disease transmission through a single source could be 
demonstrated by epidemiology to occur below the background transmission rate 
of disease from all other sources. 
In the absence of epidemiological information concerning the unrestricted 
marketing of biosolids, the use of a risk assessment approach is proposed.  Risk 
assessment could be used to determine pathogen concentrations in biosolids 
which would raise the potential transmission rate above reported transmission 
rates. 
Following on from this discussion the following principle for setting acceptable 
risks is proposed. 
Principle 3. 
The risk of disease transmission through the re-use of biosolids 
products should be less than background transmission rates for that 
disease from other sources. 
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In the case of biosolids re-use, the major limitation of this approach is that 
present biosolids re-use practices may contribute to background transmission 
rates of diseases.  However, in the absence of epidemiological information it is 
not possible to know what this impact is. 
It is also difficult to determine how much less than background transmission 
rates is acceptable.  For the risk of mortality from individuals located near nuclear 
power plants it was considered that the risk should be 0.1% of the sum of prompt 
fatality risk resulting from other accidents to which members of the US 
population were generally exposed (Spangler, 1987).  Similarly, it was considered 
that the risk of cancer fatalities to the population in the area near a nuclear power 
plant that might result from nuclear power plant operation should not exceed 
0.1% of the sum of cancer fatality risks resulting from all other causes. 
It is suggested that the rates of reported disease are a good baseline for setting 
criteria.  However, 0.1% of risk from other sources as suggested by Spangler (1987) 
appears to be too conservative when applied to risk of disease, rather than risk of 
mortality.  It is suggested that the criteria for biosolids should be based 
somewhere in the region of 1% to 10% of present infection rates, rather than 
0.1%. 
4.4.3  Exposure Assessment 
Exposure pathways have been developed by the US EPA (1989b) for the land 
application, distribution and marketing of municipal sludge.  These are shown 
below. 
1.  Sludge - Soil - Plant- Human Toxicity. 
2.  Sludge - Human Toxicity  (Soil Ingestion). 
3.  Sludge - Soil - Plant - Animal - Human Toxicity. 
4.  Sludge- Animal (Direct Ingestion) -Human Toxicity. 
5.  Sludge - Soil - Plant- Animal Toxicity. 
6.  Sludge - Animal Toxicity (Direct Ingestion). 
7.  Sludge - Soil - Plant Toxicity. 
8.  Sludge - Soil -Soil Biota Toxicity. 
9.  Sludge- Soil- Soil Biota- Predator Toxicity. 
10.  Particulate Re suspension. 
11.  Surface Runoff. 
12.  Groundwater. 
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In the case of composted biosolids applied to the home garden, it is suggested that 
the most exposed individual would come from route 2, sludge - soil ingestion. 
It is also suggested that the most exposed and at risk individual would be a child 
ingesting biosolids while playing in the home garden.  The number of children 
in the 1 to 3 years age group in Australia is approximately 520 000 (Castles, 1994). 
This at risk group therefore represents 3% of the total population of Australia.  It 
was considered that adults handling biosolids were likely to ingest smaller 
amounts than children, and therefore be at less risk. 
The exposure assessment was therefore based on soil ingestion by children, and is 
applied to each of the pathogens in Sections 4.5.1, 4.5.2 and 4.5.3 below. 
The amount of soil which young children ingest has not been clearly established 
from published studies.  Some early estimates were prepared by Lepow et.  al. 
(1974) who measured the amount of soil on children's hands.  By multiplying 
this figure by 10 they estimated the amount that would be ingested in one day as 
100 mg.  A far greater estimate was provided by Kimbrough et. al.  (1984) with 
average daily soil ingestion value estimates ranging from 100 mg to 10 g per day 
depending on age (it was estimated that children aged 18 to 42 months ingested 
the most). 
Soil ingestion studies have also been carried out using soil tracer methods.  The 
earliest reported soil ingestion study for humans was conducted by Binder et. al. 
(1986).  They used Al, Si and Ti as tracers in a study of 59 children aged 1 to 3 
years.  Their average daily soil ingestion estimates ranged from 181, 184 and 1834 
for Al, Si and Ti respectively.  The greatest limitation of this study was that food 
and other non soil sources were not measured. 
Clausing et. al.  (1987) measured soil ingestion rates in a group of 18 children aged 
2 to 4, using the tracers Ti, Aland acid soluble residue (AIR).  These were 
compared to a group of 6 children in hospital.  The concentrations of tracers in 
faecal output from the hospital children was assumed to be from dietary and 
other non-soil sources.  From this study the average daily soil ingestion was 
estimated to be 56 mg.  In a later study by the same group of workers (van Wijnen 
et. al., 1990) using the same tracers, but with 162 children, geometric mean soil 
ingestion values ranged from 0 to 200 mg/  day, depending on age and location 
(some were in day care centres and some in a camping ground).  In both these 
22 studies the authors used a procedure of selecting the lowest soil ingestion value 
from the three tracers as their best estimate. 
Calabrese et. al. (1989) conducted a study of 64 children ranging in age from 1 to 4 
years using 8 tracers.  They reported that the  median values from the three most 
reliable tracers were 29,40 and 9 mg/day from Al, Si andY.  Median values were 
reported because mean values were skewed by one child who ingested between 5 
and8g/day. 
Davis et. al.  (1990) used Al, Si and Ti as tracer elements in a study of 104 children 
aged between 2 and 7 years.  Food consumption was measured for each child. 
Average daily soil ingestion values were 39 mg, 82 and 245 for Al, Si and Ti 
respectively. 
Calabrese and Stanek (1991) evaluated the above studies on the basis of their 
potential accuracy and precision and suggested that the above results are 
unreliable.  However, their analysis was based on an adult study of only 6 
replicates (Stanek and Calabrese, 1991). 
The data produced on soil ingestion by children does not lend itself to statistical 
analysis because of the widely different procedures used.  However, from the 
studies above a semi quantitative average estimate of daily soil ingestion by 
children of 50 mg was estimated. 
However, as reported by Chaney (1993), within children there are a group called 
pica who have abnormal mouthing behaviour.  Of the sixty five children studied 
by Calabrese et al.  (1989) one had pica behaviour and ingested somewhere in the 
region of 5 to 8 g of soil per day.  In the study of van Wijnen et. al. (1990) 9 out of 
557 daily soil ingestion values were greater than 1 g/day.  In the study of Clausing 
et. al.  (1987) none of the 18 children had soil ingestion values that were 
exceptionally high for all three tracers.  The other studies did not provide enough 
information to identify pica children.  From the three studies for which data was 
available it was calculated that approximately 1 in 60 or 1.7% of children ingested 
abnormally high levels of soil.  Abnormally high ingestion rates were considered 
to be greater than 1 g per day. 
On the basis of these studies an average  'best guess' estimate for  soil ingestion 
was taken to be 50 mg soil/day.  For 1.7% of children soil ingestion may be as high 
23 as 8 g/  day.  It was estimated that an average pica child would ingest 5 g of 
soil/day. 
4.5  CRITERIA FOR SALMONELLA 
4.5.1  Acceptable Limit for Salmonella  Infection From Compos  ted Biosolids 
Setting acceptable limits for Salmonella in composted biosolids is made difficult 
by the possibility that low levels of salmonellae may regrow during the storage of 
composted biosolids or biosolids products. 
As suggested by Russ and Yanko (1981) it may be possible to predict the 
Salmonella regrowth potential of biosolids products as a function of the 
carbon/nitrogen ratio and moisture level.  Jiminez and Garcia (1991) also 
recommended that the carbon/nitrogen ratio in combination with cation 
exchange capacity could be used as a measure of biological stability.  This is an 
area that needs further investigation but in the absence of further information it 
does not appear feasible to incorporate the effect of regrowth potential on criteria 
setting. 
As an alternative approach it is suggested that sensible precautions should be 
taken to try and prevent regrowth.  A maturation period should be specified 
following composting.  Further work needs to be carried out to determine the 
required length for a maturation period.  Products should be monitored for 
salmonellae before bulk removal for sale or before bagging.  A random 
monitoring programme should be conducted for bagged products. 
For devising acceptable limits for salmonellae in composted biosolids products it 
was decided to make the assumption that background rates of transmission for 
Salmonella are acceptable to the public.  What impact present biosolids disposal 
practices have on reported cases has not been assessed, but as discussed in Section 
4.4.2, these may contribute to present background transmission rates. 
In 1991  the annual reported Salmonella infection rate for children in Australia in 
the 0 to 4 age group was approximately 400 per 100 000 (Anura and Hall, 1992). 
This means that the probability of infection was 4 x w-3.  The average notification 
rate for the whole population was 31 in 100 000 with a probability of infection of 3 
x w-4. 
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As described in Section 4.4.2, it was decided that risks of infection from 
Salmonella in biosolids should be at most in the region of 1% to 10% of reported 
infection rates.  Therefore the probability of a child becoming infected with 
Salmonella from ingesting biosolids in the home garden should be at most in the 
region of 4 x lQ-4 to 4 x 10-S. 
4.5.2  Infectious Dose for Salmonella 
The number of organisms which need to be ingested to cause an infection 
(infectious dose) is not a constant number.  It varies with a number of factors 
including: 
1.  The species of Salmonella. 
2.  The status of the individual.  Infants and the elderly appear to be 
more susceptible to infection as do those who already have another 
infection.  Other factors include the possibility of immunity and 
immune suppressing effects of some medication, such as antacids. 
3.  The vehicle in which Salmonella is administered.  It appears that 
fatty foods such as chocolate and cheese protect Salmonella from acid 
attack in the stomach and enable survival to the intestinal tract. 
For this reason it is not possible to say what the infectious dose for Salmonella 
will be in individual cases. 
The range within which the infectious dose for Salmonella is likely to fall can be 
derived from two sources.  These are human volunteer studies and outbreaks. 
Both types of studies suggest that higher doses of Salmonella appear to cause a 
higher rate of attack and quicker onset of infection.  However, there appears to be 
some discrepancies between results from the two types of studies.  As 
summarised by Blaser and Newman (1982) the lowest dose of ingested 
Salmonella reported to cause infection in human volunteer studies was lOS 
Salmonella per mL, which resulted in attack rates ranging from 17 to 35%. 
When reference to infectious dose is made it is usually based on data from 
human volunteer studies. 
Haas (1983) used infectious dose data reported by Hornick et al.  (1970) to test 
whether dose-response models could be fit to data from a human volunteer 
study.  The conclusion was that the beta distributed effectiveness model could be 
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used to describe the available data for Salmonella.  The data initially used by Haas 
(1983)  to fit the models is shown in Table 2. 
Table 2.  Data used by Haas (1983)  for Testing Salmonella Infectious Dose 
Model 
Organism and Number of 
Organisms Ingested 
Salmonella  typhosa 
103 
105 
107 
109 
Positive 
0 
32 
16 
40 
Response 
Negative 
14 
84 
16 
2 
Infectious dose information from outbreaks, as opposed to human dosing 
studies, appears to provide a different picture and this is shown in Table 3. 
Table 3 shows that in the outbreaks reported by Blaser and Newman (1982) it 
appeared that Salmonella infections were caused by materials contaminated with 
as low as 17 organisms.  In more than half of the 13 outbreaks recorded the 
infectious dose appeared to be less than 1000 organisms.  In a more recent study 
reported by D'Aoust (1985) the infectious dose from six cases caused by 
contaminated cheese appeared to be less than 10.  In the case of an elderly woman 
infection appeared to be caused by ingesting 1 Salmonella.  In the reported 
outbreaks it is possible that the calculated concentration of Salmonella in the 
infectious material was underestimated.  However, there is no direct evidence for 
this. 
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Table 3.  Calculated Doses of Salmonella  in a Number of Outbreaks (taken from 
Blaser and Newman, 1982 and *D'Aoust, 1985). 
Vehicle 
Water 
Pancreatin 
Pancreatin 
Oral Vaccine 
Hamburger 
Chocolate Balls 
Chocolate Balls 
Cheddar Cheese 
Imitation Ice Cream 
Carmine Dye Capsules 
Goat Cheese 
Ham 
Goat Cheese 
*Cheddar Cheese 
No. of Patients 
16000 
1 
1 
7to 10 
46 
95 
114 
339 
1790 
28 
6 
8 
5 
> 1500 
Estimated No. of 
Organisms Ingested 
17 
44 
200 
60 to 90 
60 to 230 
100 
250 
100 to 500 
11000 
15 000 to 60 000 
150 000 
1 X 106 to 2 X 1Q6 
1 x 1011 
0.7 to 6.1 x 100 
Ideally a probability distribution showing the probability of infection from a range 
of concentrations should be created using the data from outbreaks, as has been 
shown by Haas (1983) for data from human volunteer studies.  However, the data 
shown in Table 3 above are not sufficient to do this.  The data do not show the 
rate of infection per exposure for different exposure levels.  However, a very 
crude probability distribution has been produced by listing the number of 
outbreaks reported to be caused by a range of Salmonella  concentrations, as 
shown in Table 4.  This table also shows the percentage of the total number of 14 
outbreaks which reported infection at that dose. 
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Table 4.  Number of Outbreaks Caused by a Range of Salmonella  Concentrations 
(Data taken from Blaser and Newman, 1982 and D'Aoust, 1985) 
Infectious Dose Less 
Than: 
1 
10 
102 
103 
104 
105 
106 
107 
1011 
Number 
1 
1 
5 
9 
9 
11 
12 
13 
14 
Percentage 
7 
7 
36 
64 
64 
79 
86 
93 
100 
Table 4 shows that ingestion of 1 salmonellae resulted in disease in 1 of the 14 
reported outbreaks and ingestion of 100 salmonellae resulted in disease in 5 out 
of the 14 outbreaks.  The data is not sufficient to be used for calculating probability 
distributions but shows that the data used by Haas (1983) could result in 
underestimation of the probability of infection. 
As the outbreak data is not sufficient to generate a probability distribution model 
the beta distributed probability model generated by Rose and Gerba (1991) from 
human volunteer data appears to be the best available method of calculating 
probability of infection based on dose.  For Salmonella  the model is 
p = 1-(l+(N/139.9))-0.33 
where 
p = probability of infection and 
N =exposure 
4.5.3  Risk Characterisation 
(1) 
Equation 1 (above) was expressed in terms of N so that acceptable exposure levels 
could be calculated from acceptable probabilities, as shown below. 
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The acceptable exposure was then calculated for the range of acceptable 
probabilities of infection derived in Section 4.4.2.  This was then expressed as a 
limit for Salmonella  in biosolids material, for a normal child and a pica child, as 
shown in Table 5 below. 
Table 5.  Acceptable Limits for Salmonella  in Composted Biosolids 
Acceptable  Acceptable  Amount Ingested  Limits for  Salmonella 
Probability of  Exposure  in Composted Biosolids 
Infection  (No. of 
Organisms) 
4x lQ-4  0.169  0.05 g (normal child)  1 in 0.3 g 
4x lQ-4  0.169  5 g (pica child)  1 in 30 g 
4x lQ-5  0.0169  0.05g  1 in 3 g 
4x lQ-5  0.0169  5g  1 in 300 g 
4.5.4  Risk Criteria 
Table 5 shows that the acceptable limit for Salmonella in biosolids products 
ranges from 1 in 0.3 g to 1 in 300 g depending on which parameters are chosen. 
For determining which of these criteria would be acceptable the first principle 
suggested is that the pica child should be protected.  Although the number of 
exposed individuals in this group may be low, it is felt that these most at risk 
individuals should be protected. 
It is difficult to say what an acceptable probability of infection is.  However, it is 
proposed that a criteria of less than 1 Salmonella detected in 50 g of biosolids 
products is acceptable.  This is partially an acknowledgement of the limitations of 
methodology, and financial limitations on analysing larger quantities of biosolids 
material.  The limit of less than 1 Salmonella in 50 g of biosolids would result in 
29 a probability of infection of less than 2 x 1o-4 for a pica child, which is less than 
6% of present reported infection rates for children in the 0 to 5 age group. 
This suggested limit of less than 1 Salmonella  detected in 50 g of biosolids 
product differs from that in US EPA sludge guidelines (US EPA, 1992).  US EPA 
guidelines specify that sewage sludge which is sold or given away must contain 
less that 3 Salmonella sp. per 4 grams total solids sewage sludge (US EPA, 1992). 
These two limits differ in a number of ways.  Firstly US guidelines specify a limit 
for Salmonella per total solids, which refers to dry weight.  The suggested limit in 
this paper is per gram of biosolids product as produced, or wet weight.  The 
reason for setting a limit per gram of wet weight is that it is conceptually easier to 
apply and less analysis is required than for dry weight.  US guidelines have 
specified limits per gram dry weight in the past because there can be an apparent 
increase in concentrations through treatment such as dewatering if wet weights 
are used.  However, for routine monitoring of one type of product (composted 
biosolids) this is not an important issue. 
Secondly the two limits differ in the actual acceptable concentrations specified.  If 
composted biosolids contained approximately 50% solids, then the US limit 
would be equivalent to less than 1 Salmonella per 2.7 g of composted biosolids. 
In a mixed product containing 25% composted biosolids this would be a limit of 
approximately less than 1 Salmonella per 10 g of biosolids product.  The US 
guidelines are therefore less stringent than suggested in this risk assessment 
paper, as this would equate to a limit of less than 5 Salmonella per 50 g of 
biosolids product.  The reason for the difference is that US guidelines are based 
on detectable limits whereas this paper uses a risk assessment approach. 
However, lower concentrations of Salmonella  can be detected than the suggested 
detectable limit specified in US guidelines.  The limit of less than 1 Salmonella in 
50 g of product which is suggested on the basis of risk assessment is 
methodologically achievable. 
The third difference is that US  guidelines specify a MPN or quantitative method 
where as this paper recommends a presence/absence test.  In both US guidelines 
and this paper it is suggested that Salmonella concentrations should be below a 
certain concentration.  This can be shown by a presence/  absence test.  A 
presence/  absence test will be more cost effective than an MPN test. 
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A suggested method for carrying out a presence/absence test for Salmonella in 50 
g of composted biosolids product is that described by Hu, Gibbs and Ho (1995). 
4.6  CRITERIA FOR GIARDIA 
4.6.1  Acceptable limit for Giardia Infection From Composted Biosolids 
At present there is no published information on the effect of composting on 
Giardia  concentrations in biosolids.  Extremely high numbers of Giardia  cysts 
have been detected in anaerobically digested biosolids (Gibbs et. al., 1995). 
Unpublished data suggests that cysts are not removed by the composting process 
(Mort, personal communication). 
However, the important unanswered question with regard to Giardia  is what 
effect composting has on the viability or infectivity of cysts.  Techniques used in 
the few studies which have investigated Giardia  concentrations in biosolids have 
not been adequate to assess viability. 
The approach which has been taken in US Drinking Water Guidelines (US EPA, 
1989c) is to consider that cysts detected using microscopy are potentially viable. 
Studies have not been conducted to determine whether this is a reasonable 
assumption. 
Two studies on the effect of anaerobic digestion on Giardia cysts have suggested 
that cyst viability is greatly reduced by anaerobic digestion (Gavaghan et. al., 1993, 
van Praagh et. al., 1993). These studies were conducted using laboratory scale · 
digesters with seeded Giardia  muris (mouse) isolates.  How representative these 
are of full scale processes with indigenous human isolates is uncertain. 
Reported infection rates in the community are high.  Data is not available for the 
most at risk sub population group, young children, but reported infection rates 
for the whole community were 66 per 100 000 in 1991 in Western Australia 
(Public Health and Diseases Unit of the State Health Laboratory Services, 1992). 
The probability of infection from all sources was therefore 7 x lQ-4.  It is likely that 
the reported prevalence in the 1 to 5 age group is higher than this.  In a study of 
giardiasis in Mount Isa, Queensland, Boreham and Phillips (1986) found that 
4.6% of the population were infected with Giardia, with 12% of children in the 1 
to 5 years age group infected.  Symptoms of giardiasis also appeared to be more 
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prevalence of Giardia in Aboriginal communities, 32% of children and 12.5% of 
adults were infected with Giardia  (Meloni et. al., 1993). 
If the suggested risk of infection from Giardia from biosolids use is to present a 
risk less than from 1 to 10% of background reported infection rates, as discussed 
· in Section 4.4.2, then the probability of risk should be less than between 7.0 x lQ-5 
to 7.0 x 10-6. 
4.6.2  Infectious Dose for Giardia 
Very few studies have been conducted to determine the infectious dose for 
Giardia.  However, one of the few human dosing studies which has been 
conducted suggests that the ingestion of one Giardia cyst may be enough to cause 
infection (Rendtorff, 1954). 
An analysis of dose-response data by Rose and Gerba (1991) resulted in the 
development of a dose-response probability model as described previously for 
Salmonella  (Sections 4.5.2 and 4.5.3). 
The two equations for Giardia  are shown below. 
Single-hit exponential model 
p = 1-exp(-0.0199N) 
N = -ln(1-p)/0.0199 
where 
p = probability of infection and 
N  =exposure 
4.6.3  Risk Characterisation 
(3) 
(4) 
Using the acceptable probabilities of infection (shown in Section 4.6.1), of between 
1% and 10% of reported infection rates, and acceptable exposure levels, acceptable 
limits for Giardia  in composted biosolids were calculated for normal and pica 
children as shown in Table 6 below. 
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Table 6.  Acceptable Limits for Giardia in Composted Biosolids 
Acceptable  Acceptable  Amount Ingested  Limits for Giardia in 
Probability of  Exposure  Composted Biosolids 
Infection  (No. of 
Organisms) 
7 x 1o-s  3.5xlo-3  0.05 g (normal child)  1 in 14 g 
7x 10-S  3.5xlo-3  5 g (pica child)  1 in 1400 g 
7x 10-6  3.5xlo-4  O.OSg  1 in 140 g 
7 x 1o-6  3.5xlo-4  Sg  1 in 14 000 g 
4.6.4  Risk Criteria 
If the assumption is made that every cyst detected in biosolids products is viable, 
then depending on the assumptions made, the acceptable limits range between 1 
in 14 g to 1 in 14 000 g, as shown in Table 6. 
Based on results from monitoring studies carried out thus far, the use of any of 
the criteria shown above would preclude the re-use of biosolids which had been 
treated by composting.  The average concentration of Giardia in digested, 
dewatered biosolids was 500/g (Gibbs et. al., 1995) and in composted biosolids data 
suggest that numbers are high following composting (Gibbs, unpublished data). 
As the only study which has assessed viability suggested that Giardia cysts may be 
rendered non viable by anaerobic digestion, it does not seem prudent at this stage 
to recommend that any of the above criteria should be included in biosolids 
guidelines.  However, it is highly recommended that further research should be 
carried out to evaluate the effect of composting on Giardia cyst viability. 
4.7  ENTERIC VIRUSES 
At this point in time it is felt that reasonable criteria for acceptable concentrations 
of enteric viruses in biosolids products could not be set.  Methods for monitoring 
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viable enteric virus concentrations in biosolids are not developed enough to 
justify any method involving routine monitoring of biosolids for viruses. 
It is suggested that more work should be carried out on methods for detecting 
enteric viruses in biosolids, and research carried out on the effect of composting 
on virus concentrations in biosolids. 
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5.  CONCLUSIONS 
1.  Epidemiological studies, laboratory studies or field studies have not 
provided evidence that biosolids composted according to US EPA 
recommendations will be free of pathogens. 
2.  A risk assessment approach should therefore be used to develop 
criteria for acceptable concentrations of pathogens in biosolids 
products. 
3.  The application of risk assessment techniques to developing 
pathogen standards for biosolids re-use is difficult, because 
principles for risk assessment are not well developed for microbials, 
and data is limited. 
4.  A suggested principle is that the risk of disease transmission 
through the re-use of biosolids products should be less than 
background transmission rates for that disease from other sources. 
5.  Risks should he calculated for the most at risk sub population, 
which was suggested to be children accidentally ingesting biosolids 
in the home garden. 
6.  Composted biosolids products should be monitored for the presence 
of Salmonella, but not for Giardia  or enteric viruses.  Methods for 
Giardia  and enteric viruses are not sufficiently developed to justify 
the inclusion of monitoring requirements for  these pathogens. 
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6.  RECOMMENDATIONS 
6.1  BIOSOLIDS  GUIDELINES 
1.  Guidelines for biosolids management should include a requirement 
for monitoring biosolids products for the presence of Salmonella,  as 
the composting process does not appear to ensure the complete 
removal of Salmonella.  It is recommended that the limit for 
Salmonella in biosolids product should be less than 1 Salmonella 
detected in 50 g of biosolids product.  A suggested method is that 
described by Hu, Gibbs and Ho (1995). 
2.  As Salmonella regrowth may occur in biosolids products, guidelines 
should include requirements for a maturation period following 
composting to allow product stabilisation.  Final products should be 
monitored before bulk removal or bagging.  A random monitoring 
programme should be conducted for bagged products. 
3.  A requirement for routine monitoring biosolids products for 
Giardia or enteric viruses should not be included in guidelines until 
methods are further developed. 
6.2  FURTHER RESEARCH 
The following recommendations for further research are listed in order of 
priority. 
1.  An et-;demiological study of the unrestricted marketing of biosolids 
products should be carried out.  This would provide stronger 
evidence of the risks associated with the unrestricted marketing of 
composted biosolids products than the risk assessment approach 
described here.  Valuable information could be obtained by carrying 
out a prospective study in which purchasers of biosolids products 
were surveyed for reported illness and compared to a control group. 
2.  It has been demonstrated that Salmonella regrowth can occur in 
composted biosolids products.  Processes to control this regrowth 
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I. need to be investigated.  This area of research is currently being 
funded by WAWA and carried out at Murdoch University with the 
project 'Regrowth of Pathogens in Com  posted Sludge'. 
3.  _ Future research should be conducted to develop methods for 
determining Giardia viability in biosolids products, and these 
methods should be applied to studying the effect of composting on 
Giardia viability.  This research is essential to gain a better 
understanding of the risks associated with Giardia as the 
assumption that all Giardia  cysts are viable would prohibit the re-
use of composted biosolids.  This research is presently being funded 
by WA  WA and carried out at Murdoch University with the project 
'Presence and Viability of Giardia  in Composted Sludge'. 
4.  It appears likely that actual virus concentrations in biosolids are 
higher than can presently be measured.  Research should be 
conducted to improve methods for detecting concentrations of 
infectious virus particles in biosolids products, and then applied to 
studying the effect of composting on enteric viruses.  As a 
preliminary step a project could be developed to compare PCR 
methods to culture methods for enteric viruses. 
5.  At present there is uncertainty about the level of pathogen 
reduction which can be achieved by a fully operational windrow 
composting system.  The efficiency of windrow composting for 
pathogen removal should be fully investigated using a full-scale 
operational process.  A survey of biosolids composting facilities 
from different sites in Australia has been proposed to WAW  A. 
6.  It has been suggested in this risk assessment paper that a compost 
maturation period should be specified in biosolids guidelines.  This 
is to allow product stabilisation to prevent regrowth.  Research 
should be carried out to determine whether this is an effective 
strategy and to determine the optimum length of maturation.  This 
research could be a monitoring programme of stored composted 
products carried out in conjunction with an operator. 
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